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IN THE SUPREME COUR'T
of the

STATE OF UTAH
W. B. RUS·SELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
AND DEPOT COMPANY,
a corporation,

NEIL R. OLMS·TEAD
C. C. PATTERSON
Attorneys for Appellant

STATEMENT OF F·AC·T·s
The plaintiff commenced his employment with the
defendant on or about the 28th day of August, 1941.
For almost four years he worked for defendant without
ever having any disciplinary action against him. He
had never been called for an investigation nor had any
disciplinary action against him. He had never been called
for an investigation nor had any demerits ever been
assessed against him (Tr. 113, 170). His employment
was covered by a Collective Bar~aining Agreement.
Rules 55 (a), 55 (b) and 38 thereof p·rovide as follows :
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"55. Leave of Absence: (a) Yardmen will
not be granted leave of .absence for a longer period
than 90 days except in case of sickness, committee
work, or by permission of the Superintendent.
"(b) Yardmen taking leave of absence for a
period of over ten days must secure and fill out
Form 153 so the leave will be covered as a m·atter
of record.
"38. Investigations: No yardman will be suspended or dismis_sed without first having fair and
impartial hearing and his guilt established. The
man whose case is under consideration may be
repres.ented by an employe of his choice, who may
be a committeeman, who will be permitted to interrogate witnesses. The accused and his representative shall be permitted to hear the testimony of
w1"tnesses ... "
On or about the 4th day of July 1945 the plaintiff
was scalded while working for the defendant and \Yas off
work at least eleven days by virtue of such scalding
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and Tr. 86). "\Vnen he returned
to work, having been gone for a period of time in excess
of ten days, no one called him for an investigation nor
suggested that he could not return to work because he
had not obtained a leave of absence. At that time he did
not obtain such a leave nor ask for one, believing the
fact that as he· had visited the doctor and "~as technically
under his care, he was exonorated fron1 any application
of the rule ( Tr. 234 and 235).
After the sealding plaintiff returned to work and
worked for a matter of several days (Plaintiff's Exhibit
"A"), and on or about July 20 or 21st h;e laid off sick
because of a cold. He only intended to be gone a day
or two and did not intend to be gone in excess of ten
2
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days (Tr. 85, 86 and 216). After he had be·en off work
for approximately six d.ays he becam·e sufficiently ill that
his wife drove him to the doctor (Tr. 216 and 217). His
condition was diagnosed as a mid-ear infection which
frequently took a long series of treatment (Tr. 225). He
received two prescriptions from the doctor on July 27,
an atomizer for his sore throat and medication for his
ear.
After treatment from the doctor he went home and
remained home in bed until he w.as called on August 1st
at 6 :30 o'clock in the morning to report for a formal
investigation at 2 P.M. of that date for reason of his
alleged violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, by reason of his being abs:ent without leave for a
period in excess of ten days.
It is conceded by the defendant in its Answers to
Interrogatories, Answers to Requests for Admissions,
and the testimony of John E. 0. Burton (Tr. 38-43) that
no witnesses testified at said hearing except Russell;
that Russell heard no testimony against himself; that
he was not permitted to interrogate witnesses because
no witnesses were produced; and that he was given no
opportunity for re.buttal, there being no testimony adverse to him introduced which would require rebuttal;
and that the transcript of the said investigation is a
full and complete record of the alleged hearing.
On the 4th day of August, 1945, the defendant dismissed the plaintiff from it's service, assigning as its
reason therefor that plaintiff had been absent from his
employment for a period of over ten days in violation
of Rule 55 (b).
3
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On January 14, 1946, and within .a period of six
months from the date of discharge, plaintiff filed with
defendant written obj-ections to his dismissal, and requested reinstatement (Exhibit "B"). On January 22,
1946 defendant, through it's Superintendent, reaffirmed
the dismissal (Exhibit "C").
This case was tried previously and appe.aled to this
court in Russell vs. O.U.R. ~ D. (Utah) 247 P. (2) 257.
At that time the defendant ba.sed its appeal primarily
upon the fact that it contended it had proof and could
prove, but was denied the opportunity by the lower court,
that the plaintiff had been guilty of a misrep-resentation
at the time of the hearing when he said he was ill, and
that it could prove and had proof that the plaintiff was
not ill but in fact the plaintiff worked each and every
day during the period of his absence at the Pine View Inn
selling beer, and that fact was also conceded by his
Union representative, Mr. C. E. McDaniels, Vice President of the Switchmen's Union of North America. This
court believed those representations and !1:r. Justice
McDonough held that it would be a travesty of justice
to permit the p~laintiff to recover on the basis of the
hearing alone, when the defendant could prove the falsity
of his statements. This view was concurred in by Justice
Crockett who found that the plaintiff's own representative finally conceded that plaintiff "~as justifiably discharged. These findings were conclusions and not based
upon fact. The facts were that Mr. !fcD.aniels \Yithdrew
from the case solely upon instructions from nlr. Cashin,
International President of the s,vitclunen's Union of
North America (Tr. 192, 193 and 197) for the sole
re·ason that the plaintiff was not a dues p:aying member
of the Switchmen's Union of North A1nerica. He stated
4
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further that he had personally made an investigation as
to whether the plaintiff had testified falsely at said
hearing and had come to the conclusion as a result of
his personal inquiry that he could find no false testimony
(Tr. 187), and that the facts contained in Mr. Hudgens'
letter to Mr. Edens were in fact correct.
Mr. McDaniels testified further that he did not concede at any time that his withdrawal from the case was
not done with plaintiff's consent (Tr. 201), rand that his
letter to Paulson meant and should have been interpreted
to mean that his withdr,aw.al from the case was without
any prejudice to the plaintiff's right to proceed further
('Tr. 210, 212, 213), and that he so advis-ed Mr. Russell
to that effect (Tr. 214).
On the other hand, Mr. Edens, Superintendent of
the defendant, conceded th~at he had never had any personal knowledge that plaintiff was not in fact sick and
that he did not know of a single solitary soul who knew
whether Russell was sick or not (Tr. 117). In answer to
interrogatories and admissions the defendant conceded
that no inquiry was ever made by 'anyone as to whether
the plaintiff had been ill or testified fals-ely in the investigation until April of 1946, eight months after the plaintiff was discharged.
1\Ir. Paulson, Vice President of the defendant,
admitted all of these facts ~nd te.stified in addition
thereto that pl'aintiff was not discharged solely because
he had been absent for ten days but that part of the
reason for the discharge was outside employment (Tr.
174), a subject not a part of the formal investigation
and not a ground for discharge under the contract.

5
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THE NATURE OF THE CASE ON APPEAL
T·he questions raised by this appeal are :
(1)

for

Doe.s Rule 55(b) constitute a proper ground

disch~arge ~

(2) Did the defendant accord to the p,laintiff his
rights under Rule 38 ~
(3) Is defendant bound.by its testimony and oral
argument that plaintiff was discharged at least in part
for reasons other than Rule 55 (b) ~
( 4) Did the court err in its instructions and its
refusal to give the plaintiff's requested instructions~
POINT I
RULE 55(b) D·OES NO·T CONSTITUTE A GRO·UND FOR
DISCHARGE.

The defendant charged the plaintiff with a violation
of Rule 55 (b) and discharged him for an asserted violation thereof:

"55. (b) Yardmen taking leave of absence
for a p.eriod of over ten days must s-ecure .and fill
out Form 153 so the leave will be covered M a
matter of record."
It is necessary for a proper consideration of this
problem to consider also Rule 55 (a) :

"55. (a) Yardmen "\Yill not be granted leave
of abs.ence for a longer period than 90 days except
in case of sickness, con1mittee "\York, or by permission of the Superintendent."
It will be seen that no leaves "\vill be granted in excess
of 90 days unless they .are approved by the Superintendant, except in case of sickness or ·COn1n1ittee work.
6
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Nowhere is it indicated that permission is required for
illness or committee work. Nowhere is it suggested that
a man cannot be away for more than 90 days as a matter
of right.
If that be true, and the language can't be denied,
does it follow that if a man is away for a lesser period,
that he must have the apr-roval of anyone, particularly
where, a.s here, the rule s.tates that the only purpose
is so that the leave can be covered as a matter of record.
Clearly the first requirement of the rule is that an
employee intends to be away for more than 10 days. This
is conceded by the defendant. Its Mr. Beckett, a signatory to the contract, testified (Tr. 128) :
"A.

Q.

Well, that rule itself tells you what you will
do to secure a leave of absence.
That means if you anticipate being off for
a period of time in excess of ten days, doesn't
1"t~.

A. That's right."
Again discussing illness (Tr. 128-129):

"Q.

Suppose you didn't .anticipate being off for
a period of ten days but just for example on
the lOth day you were in an automobile accident and ended up in the hospital, did the
union contend that he had violated the rule
because he hadn't gotten the written leave
before he went to the hospital~
A. Well, in cases of that nature the local chairman would be aware of those things and if a
man was injured or in the hospital the loeal
chairman made application for leave of absence. That covered the man."
And again (Tr. 131-132):
7
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"Q.

When he was sick in

bed~

A.

Well, if he was sick in bed we usually provided
for that.

Q.

What do you mean you usually provided for
that~

A. Well, if we found that ·a man was sick in bed
or was injured and so forth, that he was more
or less gr.anted a leave of ·absence when it was
a bona fide fact that such wa.s the case."
This is the only testimony on this phase elicited
from any of the defendant's witnesses. The defendant
is bound by it. On the other hand, the uncontradicted
testimony is that the plaintiff did not anticipate being
away for over 10 days. In fact he expected and planned
to be absent for only a couple of days (Tr. 222-22.3).
Nowhere did the defendant attempt to contradict or deny
this fact.
Further, it was conceded that thi.s \Vas not a disciplinary rule. Mr. Beckett, the defendant's ''~tness, testified that he did not know of any rule of the defendant
th.at provided for a penalty for the violation of Rule
55 (b).
This conduct on the part of the defendant and its
agents, and its recognition that it is the only reasonable
and p·roper interpretation finds ruuple support in law.
It has long been recognized that the Inere failure to
obey orders not involving wilful insubordination is not
enough to justify discharge. Thus in 1886 the Supreme
Court of Michigan recognized the rule, Shaver vs. Ingerham, 26 N.\V. 162. The· plaintiff liad been hired for one
year. l-Ie absented hin1self from work for one day conS
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trary to the express desires of the defendant who discharged him. The court, in affirming judgm.ent for the
plaintiff, reviewed the law and concluded:
"In Filleiul v. Armstrong, 7 Ado I. & E. 557,
the failure of a teacher to return within a day
or two .after vaeation, although it wa.s strongly
urged that the course of the school was seriously
interfered with, was held not .sufficient when s~e.t
up in a plea to answer the case made by the
declaration, and no ground to justify the discharge. The language of the court is clear on
the insufficiency of the showing, and it was suggested that, even if ,actual loss was shown, it
would be the ground of claim for reduction of
wages, and not of discharge, where there was no
serious moral wrong. In Callo v. Broun·cker, 4
Car. & P. 518, the jury were told that there must
be mo:ral misconduct, pecuniary or otherwise, willful disobedience, or habitual neglect, to justify
dismissal from service for a year; and, although
both disobedience and neglect of orders were
shown in several instances, the court would not
let the jury act upon them 'as a serious enough to
be sufficient. In that ~case the ser·vant was a
traveling courier. In Edwards v. Levy, 2 Fost. &
F. 94, where there was a single act of neglect
accompanied by insolence, the court held the plaintiff's case should go to the jury, as this. could n·ot
be held, as matter of law, ground for discharge.
The cases of Cussons v. Skinner, 11 Mee·s. & W.
161, and Smith v~ Allen, 3 Fost. & F. 157, in addition to requiring disobedience to he willful, call
attention to another elem'ent of decision, which is
especially applicable here. It is held, not only
that a .sufficient cause must be shown, but also
that the wrong was actually the real cause of
dismis~sal, and not merely an ostensible re ason.
9
1
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"Willful disobedience, in the sense in which
the word is used by the authorities, means something more than a conscious failure to obey. It
involves a wrongful or perverse disposition, such
as to render the conduct unreasonable, and inconsistent with prop,er subordination. We are not
prepared to hold that, even in what is known
as menial service, every act of disobedience may
be lawfully punished by the penalty of dismissal
and the serious consequences which it entails
upon the .servant put out of place. No doubt
domestic employment may be closer than that in
business employment; but there must be a limit
to the arbitrary power of masters. In such employments as involve a higher order of services,
and some degree of discretion and judgment, it
would, in our opinion, be unauthorized and un~
reasonable to regard skilled mechanics, or other
employes, as subject to the whim and caprice
of their employers, or as deprived of all right
of action to .such a degree as to be liable to lose
their places upon every omission to obey orders,
involving no serious consequences.''
In 1899 the Supreme Court of Indiana in Hamilton
v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 53 N.E. 181, reached the same
conclusion independently, and affirmed a judgment for
the plaintiff, stating:
"The master "Tould have no right to discharge the servant for trivial or unimportant
acts of disobedience or negligence."
It must be concluded therefor that a mere breach
of ,a rule or neglec.t to adhere to it, if done inadvertently,
is not sufficien~t to ju,stify a discharge. l\Iore is required.
The additional elen1ents are intent and "\Yilfullness.
In the ease of Ehlers v. Langley, (Calif.) 237 Pac.

10
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55, the court held :
"Although it is not necessary that the violation be perverse or malicious, or that it be the
result of an evil intent toward the master, it must
be made cle·ar that the thing done or omitted to be
done was done or omitted intentionally, the rule
being grounded on the theory that willful disobedience of specific instructions of the master, if such
instructions be reasonable and consistent with the
contract of employment, is a breach of dutya bre·ach of the. cont:vact of service; and like
any other breach of contract, of itself entitles
the master to renounce the contract of employment."
In Goudal v. DeMille Pictures Corp., (C.alif.) 5
Pac. (2) 433, it was held:
"To constitute a refusal or failure to perform
the conditions of a contract of employment such
as we have here, there must be, on the p~art of
the actress, a willful act or willful misconduct.
(May v. New York Motion Picture Corp. 45
Cal. App. 396, 187 P. 785; Ehlers v. Langley &
Michaels Co. 72 Cal. App. 21.4, 237 P. 55)."
So even though it be s.aid that the failure of an
incapacitated employee to secure and fill out Form 153
covering his absence constitutes a technical violation
of the rule, still such violation, being neither willful
nor intentional, eannot be used by the employer as a
ground for discharge.
And in Bang v. International Sisal Co., Minn. 4 N.W.
(2) 113, the court held:
"The privilege of discharge has been said to
exist in those cases where there has been a
material breach of the employment contract, and
11
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"wilful disobedience" is recognized as such a
breach."
The above cases set forth .a role that has been recognized as a role in the federal court since 1913. In Carpenter Steel Co. v. Norcross, 6th Cir. 204 F. 537 the
court had the p.roblem of a wrongful discharge and for
the fir~st time discussed what type of misconduct would
in fact justify a discharge. In so considering the problem,
the court laid down the following rule:
"And preliminary thereto a wol'ld or two
should be said as to the nature of the misconduct
which the l~aw makes a justification for a discharge. It is certain that conduct involving moral
turp~itude, willful insubordination, or habitual
neglect is such misconduct as to justify a discharge. An early case limited justification thereto.
But it is now 'vell settled that any conduct which
is predudicia:l or likely to be prejudicial or injures
or has a tendency to injure the master is misconduCJt that w.arrants a discharge, 20 A. & E.
Enc. of Law, p. 27; 26 Cyc. pp. 988, 990.
"In Wood, ~faster and Servant, p. 208, the
law is st~ated thus: '~Iisconduct prejudicial to the
master's interests, although not exhibiting moral
turpitude, is good cause for the discharge of a
servant. And conduct exhibiting moral turpitude,
although productive of no damage to the n1aster's
interests, is a good ground for ten1rinating the
contract. Mere misconduct, not an1ounting to insubordination, or exerting a bad influence over
other servants, or producing injury to the 1naster's
business, or 1nembers of the 1na.ster's fa1nily, is
not enough to "\Yarrant the discharge of a servant. The mi.sconduct 1nust be gross or such .as
1s incompatible with the relation, or pernicious

12
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in its influence, or injurious to the master's business.'
"And again on page 220 the matter is put
thus : 'In order to justify a master in discharging
a servant the servant must have been guilty of
conduct that amounts to a breach of some expre.ss or implied provision of the contract of
hiring. Anything less than that will not amount
to a legal justification or excuse. The mere fact
that he has been guilty of improper or unbecoming conduct, . or that he has, in some slight
matters, been guilty of a violation of his master's
orders, will not warrant his discharge; but his
conduCit must have been such .as to involve moral
turpitude and hi.s insubordination must have been
willful and such as is inconsistent with the relation which he holds to the mas.ter and the duties
he owes him.' "
See .also K eserich v. Carnegie Ill. Steel Corp., 7th
Cir. 163 F. (2) 889; Seagram & Sons v. Bynum, 8th
Cir. 191 F. (2) 5, Sawyer v. E. F. Drew & Co., 111 Fed.
Supp. 1; Thomas v. N.Y., C. & St. L. R. Co., 97 F. Sup·p.
687; Crisler v. Ill. Central R. Co., 5th Cir. 196 F. (2) 941.
In addition, to justify the discharge, it must be
shown that the plaintiff knew th.at his failure to fill
out and secure Form 153 might be used by his employer
as a ground for discharge. True it is in this case the
defendant proved that it had in the past used a violation of Rule 55 (b) as a reason for discharge, but it
did not prove nor offer to prove that it had ever discharged an ·employee for viol,ating the rule where the
absence resulted from illnes.s or accident. On the contrary, the defendant's witnesses conceded thaJt such persons were protected.
13
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W ~ submit the following cases as additional authority for the proposition that the defendant could not
properly disch,arge this employee for a violation of the
rule resulting from illne.ss without a showing that it
had in th·e past invoked the s.ame penalty against other
employees for similar violations: National Labor Relations Board v. Kohen-Ligon-Folz, 128 F. (2) 502;
National Labor Relations Board v. Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co., 132 F. (2) 234; National Labor Relations Board v.
Viking Pump Co., 113 F. (2) 759; National Labor Relations Board v. Empire Worsted JYiills, 129 F. (2) 688;
National Labor Relations Board v. Oregon Worsted
Co. 96 F. (2) 193.
Finally, as the rule itself states, the filling out of
the form is solely to make the absence a matter of
record. Unless, therefore, defendant has shown (and it
h·as not) that in failing to have a form covering this
particular absence as a matter of record it has been
adversely affected, the purely technical violation of the
rule could not be relied upon as a basis for discharge.
Moreover, that the filling out of the form i.s merely for
the record shows that the requirement of the rule relates
only to intentional, voluntary absences. Imagine an employee being required to fill out a form stating in substance, "I hereby app.Iy for a leave of absence for the
purpose of being sick for a period in excess of ten days."
It is submitted that Rule 55 (b) was not available
as a ba.sis for an investigation or as a reason for discharge for the following reasons, any one of which
standing alone obviates the acts of the defendant:
(1) The defendant never has pleaded, claimed or
offered to prove that the plaintiff intended, when he
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laid off, to be gone in excess of 10 days.
(2) The defendant never pleaded, claimed or offered to prove that the absence was willful or intentional.
(3) The defendant never pleaded, claimed or offered to prove that the plaintiff knew that the rule
applied to illness or sickness.
(4) The defendant never ple~aded, claimed or offered to prove that the violation of the rule materially
damaged the defendant.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ACCORD TO' THE PLAINTIFF HI1S RIGHTS UNDER RULE 38.

It has been conceded that plaintiff's employment
was governed by a contr.act made and entered into by
the defendant and the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen. The contract \Vas authorized by the Railway Labor
Act. As such it has been ruled that substantive questions
of law are to he governed by the federal interpretations.
Thus concepts of negligence are governed by federal
decisions and do not vary with the varying concepts
of negligence applicable under state and local laws,
and federal decisional law formulating and applying to
concept govern.s, U rie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 93 L.
Ed. 1282. The law, as established by decisions, is binding
upon state courts, Jester v. Southern Railway Co. (S.C.)
29 S.E. (2) 768. This view is substantiated ~and followed
on contract cases, Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.,
v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653, 97 L. Ed. 1325.
The federal rule is laid down in Transcontinental &
Western Air, Inc., v. Koppal, 199 F. (2) 117, which was
not available to this court at the time of its first decision
15.
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in this case. In the Koppal case, the plaintiff was employed under a contract between the _defendant and the
International Association of Machinists. The provisions
for a hearing are substantially identical to the case at
bar. The contract was likewise one under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 181 et seq. The 8th Circuit had
to define fair hearing and held :
"In so far as the term 'fair hearing' in its
use in this provision could be said to imply that
a discharge should de·pend, not simply upon
whether cause might ·exist in fact, but rather
upon whethe:r p-roof of the existence of such
cause was sufficiently made against the employee
at a hearing as to be capable of inducing and to
have constituted the basis of the employer's action, what we have said above is here equally
controlling of plaintiff's lack of right on the evidence to have these questions tested by a jury
as a matter of 'fair hearing.' No more on this
particular aspect than on the general question
considered above, does the evidence afford any
basis for a jury to say that sufficient cause
legally for discharge was not proved or that the
employer's action was not taken on the basis of
this .p:roof. It should be added also th·at the question of bias or prejudice in the hearing officer
as an element of 'fair hearing' is not here involved.
"If therefore any jury question existed in
the situation in relation to the contractual provision for 'fair hearing,' it would only be because
of the impossibility of saying as a matter of law
that all of the processes which the agreement
required to underlie the hearing, and which accordingly constituted in·cidents thereof, had been
p,rope-rly complied with, .and so a legal doubt
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could exist as to the significance of such omission or deviation as had occurred, which the
employee wa.s entitled to have appraised in relation to whether on all the circumstances there
had been a breach of the prescription for 'fair
hearing' with its intended incidents., and whether
the employee had been prejudiced thereby."
See also Atlantic Coast Line v. Brotherhood, 210
F. (2') 812; New Or.leans Public Belt R. v. Ward, 195
F. (2) 829; Buster v. M. & St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 195 F
(2) 73.
This court has recognized that the contract must
be adhered to as a condition precedent to discharge.
Russell v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra. At page
261 it stated:
"It is true that in a proper case the tra;nseript
of the he~aring might itself reveal unjust discharge. Thus, if it showed conclusively that the
plaintiff was not accorded his rights under the
contract: that he was not given adequate notice,
or was not given opportunity to be heard or to
be repre.sented by an employee of his choice,
the discharge would be wrongful, because according the employee such rights is, under the
contract, a condition precedent to discipline or
discharge."
The contract, and in particular Rule 38, provides in
part as follows :
"38. I nvesti,qations: No yardman will be
suspended or dismissed without first having a
fair and impartial hearing and his guilt established. The man whose case is under consideration may be represented by an emp~oyee of his
choice, who may be a committeeman, who will
be permitted to interrogate witnesses. The ac-
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cused and his representative shall be permitted
to hear the testimony of witnesses."
It is readily ascertained that as a condition to discharge the plaintiff is entitled to the following, unless
he admit.s his guilt:
(1)
volved.

The rule must be a pplic.able to the facts in-

(2)
nesses.

He is entitled to hear the testimony of wit-

(3)

He is entitled to interrogate witnesses.

( 4) He is entitled to have a fair and impartial
hearing and his guilt established.
( 5)

He is entitle·d to notice.

(6) He is entitled to be represented by an employee of his choice.
Of these six elements only the l·ast two were accorded the plaintiff. Indeed the defendant coneedes by
interrogatory admissions .and testimony that no evidence
was introduced against him, no witnesses appeared, so
that he was deprived of his opportunity to cross-examine.
Indeed, by the admission of the defendant, it possessed,
even under it's version of the facts, no testimony or
evidence contradictory to that adduced at the hearing
until over eight months had elapsed.
Under the Federal rule, as well as the Utah rule,
it must be conceded that the defendant did not comply
with its require~d condition precedent and that th·e discharge thus effected was in viol~ation of the contract
and the law.
It might be appropri·ate to exarnine the defendant's
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claimed evidence based upon which it claim.s plaintiff
was not ill. It is based upon two letters (Defendant's
Exhibits 3 and 6) in which Dr. Stratford states that
plaintiff was cap·able of working after his release on
July 11, 1945.
There is no argument about that. It will be recalled
that plaintiff w,a,s scalded prior to July 11, and was
being treated by Dr. Stratford. At the conclusion of
his treatment he was relea.sed for work and did in fact
work. Dr. Stratford's letter related to that accident
and not to plaintiff's subsequent illness.
Dr. Stratford did not state that he wasn't ill subsequent to that time. Defendant attempts to draw that
inference, but in so doing it of necessity must make
a liar out of Dr. Stratford and accuse its own witne.ss
of unethieal conduct. Subsequent to July 11, the plaintiff saw Dr. Stratford who treated him for an infection
of the inner ear and a sore throat, who later certified
that he needed no more treatment, .and released him
from his care to return to work. The release would be
pointless and needless if plaintiff had never been under
any disability to start with and would itself have constituted a fraud on the defendant.
It is suggeste~d that plaintiff- was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There was no jury issue to
submit relative to whether the contract was complied
with, as all of the evidence was to the effect that it was
not. There was and is no dispute as to the relevant
facts adduced at the hearing. It is so well e.stablished
as to require no citations that where there are no issues
of fact, it is for the court to decide.
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POINT III
DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY ITS TESTIMONY AND ORAL
ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF' WAS DISCHARGE·D· AT LEAST
IN PART FOR REASONS OTHER THAN RULE 55(b).

!This was conceded by counsel in his opening statement. In commenting on what he intended to prove,
he quoted Mr. P~aulsen, the Vice President of the Defendant, as follows (Tr. 11):
"Mr. Paulsen said in substance and effect,
and these men will have to tell you exactly what
it is, and this will be the evidence, it's the position of the company that 1\{r. Russell did not
tell the truth at that investigation, that he was
not sick during that period as he contends that
he was, but that he was op·erating the Pineview
Inn at the head of Ogden Canyon."
And again (Tr. 13):
"Now, it's our position that during all this
ten day period and prior thereto Mr. Rus.sell
was not t~aking care of his job but was operating
a beer tavern at Pineview Inn, quite an establishment."
The defendant in so stating actually bound itself
to the fact that it was trying the plaintiff for acts other
than that upon which the investigation was based. This
position w.as born out in the testin1ony of Mr. Paulsen,
supra (Tr. 174).
The defendant 'vas and is bound as a matter of
law by its uncontradicted testimony and the statement
of its attorney.
See: Le-high Valley R. Co. r. McGranalwn 6 F. (2)
431; Security State Bank v. M oss1nan, 131 Kan. 505,
292 P. 935; Sinunons v. Harris, (Okla.) 235 P. 508;
Rorvick v. Astoria Box & Paper Go., Ore. 299 P. 333.
20
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It is contended that that statement and testimony
conclusively demonstrate, that the defendant's alleged
position is a farce, beeaus-e it concedes that they were
trying him for causes not within the scope of the rule.
Under a contract such as this, a proper discha.rge
may not be had without a hearing, nor may a discharge
be supported upon grounds other than those stated in
the specific charge. In Kiker v. Insurance Company,
(N.M.) 23 P. (2) 366, the court s~aid:
"Generally, in an .action for wrongful discharge, the employer may plead in defense any
sufficient cause, though it may have been unknown to him at the time, though his real reason
or motive may have been something else, and
though another cause may have been expressly
assigned. Williston on Contracts, Sec. 744, 839;
Labatt on Master and Servant, S·ec. 187; Page
on Contracts (2d Ed), Sec. 3058; 19 R.C.L. 516;
39 C.J. 89.
"But the parties of course have the right to
stipulate the manner in which the employe-r may
terminate the contract. If they stipulate that
it shall be by written notice .specifying the e;ause,
a discharge specifying no cause, or an insufficient
cause, would be wrongful. It follows that, under
such a contract, a cause not specified would not
be available in defense. 620, 55 Am. St. Rep.
375, cited; 18 R.C.L. 516, Mortimer v. Bristol, 190
App. Div. 452, 180 N.Y.S. 55."
In Cole v. Loew's Inc., 8 Fed. Rules Dec. 508, the
court said:
"Where the contract specified grounds for
termination or suspension and written notice is
provided for, the employer, in order to justify
hi.s action, must show that the ground given in
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the notice actually existed. He cannot justify his
action on other grounds named in the contract,
which, although true, were not stated in the
notice."
And in Levy v. Jarett, (Tex.) 198 S.W. 333, the
court said:
"If the acts of misconduct other than planning to enter business for himself now charged
against the plaintiff would have justified his discharge, they were not made the basis of the termination of the contract and could not affect the
plaintiff's right to recover on it, .as the defendant
at that time did not treat .such acts as being a
breach of contract * *"
Thus we submit the action of the defendant was
illegal and in breach of the contract and the law.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS AND ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF\JS REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.

The court refused to give any instructions that in
any way encompassed the federal rule or even those
phas-es of it that this court has recognized and adopted.
On the contrary, the court ·w··ent far and beyond any
established law in the giving of its instructions. It 'vent
far beyond any request of the defendant 'vho advised
the court of that fact. An exan1ination of the following
part of the record is illu1ninating:
"Mr. Olmstead: Con1es now the plaintiff,
both sides having rested in tllis action, and in
the absence of the jury, excepts to the instructions of the court to the jury as follows:

"1. Excepts to that portion of instruction
number two designated as sub paragraph t'vo

22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

thereof. Excepts to that portion of instruction
number two under sub paragraph 3A thereof appearing in parenthesis and reading as follows:
'In other words an employee cannot recover for
being dismissed on a charge which is true, regardless of whether or not he was accorded a
proper investigation because the law presumes
that had he been accorded a proper investigation
he would have been dismissed anyway. Under
such a circumstance, the sufficiency of the investigation is immaterial.'
"Mr. Bronson: In that connection, your
Honor, I believe that is a little bit too favorable
to me. I think maybe it would bei accurate if it
read in substance something like this : In other
words an employee cannot recover for being dismissed on a charge which is true regardless of
whether or not he was accorded a proper investigation beeause the law presumes had he been accorded a proper investigation, and something to
the effect right in there and the fact was made
to appear that he had violated the rule or that
he was guilty of the charge, he would have been
dismissed anyhow.
"The Court: I think that is covered well
enough."
The quoted instruction is diametrically opposite, not
only to the rule of Transcontinental & Western .Air, Inc.,
v. K appal, supra, but it is also diametrically opposed
to the rule of this court which states that compliance
with the contractual provisions is a condition ptecedent
to discharge.
Where, it might be asked, is there a presumption
that the hearing and compliance with the contract is
immaterial if grounds for discharge did in fact exist~
23
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If such is the law, of what value is a contract~ It is
submitted that the Instruction No. 2, and particularly
the quoted portion thereof, is erroneous, contrary to
law, and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff.
The court's Instructions No. 3 and No. 5 are also
incorrect statements of the law and prejudicial to the
rights of the plaintiff. These errors are similar and
these two instructions can more ea.sily be considered
together. In Instruction No. 3 the court gratuitously
raised an issue neither raised, pleaded or contended
by the defendant as to an implied waiver of his contractual rights. No evidence was directed to that issue.
In addition, the second paragraph of such instruction states :
Rule 38 above does not insure an employee
that he will not be dismissed on a charge for
which he is innocent because it may be possible
that after an investigation in full compli•ance with
Rule 38 a mistake might occur. In such an event
the Railroad is not libel."
Mistake is. not a defense to a breach of an employment ·contract. The rule is laid out in 56 C.J.S. (Master
and Servant) Section 51:
"It ha.s been held, however, that a master
may defend an .action for 'v-rongful discharge by
showing that the discharge 'Yas by mistake, and
that as soon as the mistake 'vas discovered, and
before the s-ervant had sustained any damages, he
offered to revoke, and insisted in revoking, the
discharge."
The defendant did none of th-e things nece.ssary to
set up or claim the defense of mistake, nor did it at
any time revoke or offer to revoke a mistake, or even
24
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claim any rnistake was made. The instruction in its
incomplete form w~as not only inapplicable to the issues
and incorrect, but it could only serve to mislead ,and
confuse the jury.
The court compounded this error by it's instruction
No. 5 a.s follows:
"You are instructed that the defendant had
a right to dismiss any employee, including the
plaintiff W. B. Russell, for violation of Rule
55 (b) of the contract which is in evidence,, so
long as the defendant was not acting in bad faith
and arbitrarily, and so long as the employee was
physically able to comply with the provisions of
said rule 55 (b). And if you find that the plaintiff did violate said rule 55 (b) being physically
able to comply therewith, and that the defendant w~s not acting in bad faith and arbitrarily
when it dismissed him for such violation, your
verdict should be in favor of the· defendant and
against the plaintiff 'no cause of action.' "
It will be observed that before the plaintiff can
win he must show two elements:
(1)

"bad faith on the part of the defendant."

( 2) That it was physically impossible for the plaintiff to go down and get his form No. 153 prepared.
This is another way of stating if in good faith
the defendant made a mi.stake there is no liability. Is
this the ordinary contract law that the defendant talks
about~ Is this the standard treatment for the bre,ach of
an ordinary garden variety contract~
It was impossible for the plaintiff to Win if the
jury followed these instructions. It should be no sur25
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prise, therefore, that the jury found against the p·laintiff.
It was never claimed nor conceived that the law
was such that if it was physically possible for a man
to leave a hospital or sick bed, no matter how critical
his condition might be, that his failure to do so would
justify his discharge. Such a statement and conclusion
is contrary to every case cited above. Nor was it ever
claimed or. conceived that even if a person did so remove himself from a ho.spital or sick bed and was discharged, that the defendant should go free if it made
a mistake and acted in good faith.
If, by the provisions of Instruction No. 5, the plaintiff to recover had to prove bad faith on the part of
the defendant and in addition a physieal impossibility
on his plart to perform, the defendant was entitled to
a directed verdict because the plaintiff did not claim
and he made no effort to prove that it was physically
impossible for him in his illness to have gone to his
place of employment or that the defendant acted in
good or bad faith. The jury thus had no alternative
but to find as it did.
Similarly the jury could well find that the defendant made a mistake, becaus-e the defendant did make a
mistake in not according the plaintiff his contractual
protection-or it eould find that it acted in good faith.
If it found either, it 'vould have to conclude that the
plaintiff had a fair hearing not,vithstanding the defendant's admissions that illness, not physical impo.ssibility,
w.as a defense, ;and not,Yithstanding the defendant's admitted flagrant breach of the contract requirements.
By so instructing the jury, the trial court effec2'6
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tively prevented the plaintiff from a fair jury trial.
Even had the jury been instructed properly, the plaintiff would not have had a chance to recover his proper
legal damages because by Instruction No. 7 the court
departed from the rule of damage.s laid down by the
court in Russell v. O.U.R. & D., supra, and substituted
one that permitted speculation and completely ignored
the rule that the defendant must prove mitigation:
"If you believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff has sustained the burden of proof and
is entitled to recover, you will then have the
duty of assessing his damages, if any.
"The damages plaintiff is entitled to recover,
in the event you decide he i.s entitled to recover
at all, is the amount you may believe from the
evidence he would have earned on account of
his continued employment by the defendant, less
whatever amount you believe the evidence shows
he has e~arned since he left the defendant's employment.
"Therefore, you should first determine what
you believe he would have earned had he continued in the employme.nt of the defendant, taking
into consideration his rate of pay and the number
of days you believe he would have worked, so
far as shown by the evidence. In considering the
amount he would have so earned, you should, so
far as is shown by the ·evidence, consider whether
he would have worked every day he was entitled
to work during the period in question, or whether
he would have been off work at times on account
of holidays, vacations, leaves of absence, illness
or other causes.
"From such an amount as you thus determine
plaintiff would have earned h~ad he continued
27
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working for defendant, you must next deduct
what the evidence shows he has ·earned during
the period of time in question in other empJoyment or business.''
Finally, it is submitted that the court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's proposed instructions 1 to 12,
which set out the rules of law as set forth in the federal
decision,s hereinabove discussed, to the effect that the
contractual condition precedent must be complied with,
that the type of misconduct th~at would justify discharge
must be defined, and the correct rules relative to the
burden of proof must be set forth.
The only instructions offered or given that purport
in any way to comply with these federal rules, as set
down in Transcontinental & Western Air Inc., v. Koppal,
supra, were plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 1 which
was refused by the court. As it is written it is entirely
within the scope of the former decision in this action.
It is a correct statement of the law and it is not covered
by any of the court's instructions, and states :
"You are instructed that the contract of employment, Article 8, Rule 38, provides as far as
is here material, as follows:
" 'Investigations: No yardman "ill be suspended or dismissed without first having a fair
and imparti~al hearing and his guilt established.
The man whos-e case is under consideration may
be represented by an employee of his choice, w·ho
n1ay be a comn1itteeman, 'vho will be permitted
to interrogate witnesses. The accused and his
representative shall be permitted to hear the testimony of witnesses.'
"You are instructed that pl,aintiff 'Yas on
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August 4, 1945 di.scharged for an alleged violation of Rule 55 (b) of the contract in that he had
been absent from work for a period in excess
of 10 days without leave. In order for such discharge to have been lawful and just it is essential
that plaintiff have been afforded the type of
hearing described above. Accordingly, if you find
from a preponderance of the evidence that he
was not afforded a fair and impartial hearing,
or that his guilt was not established, or that he
was not permitted to hear the witnes.ses against
him or was not provided the other rights therein
set forth, his discharge was not lawful.
"In considering this matter you are first to
consider the transcript of the record of such proceedings which has been received in e-vidence. If
you find therefrom that the same conclusively
show:s that plaintiff was not afforded his rights
under the contract, then you will find that plaintiff's discharge was wrongful. On the other hand,
if you find that such transcript does not conclusively show that plaintiff was not afforded
his rights under the contract, then in determining this matter you will consider such other evidence touching upon the matters referred to as
is before you."
Plaintiff's propo.s·ed instructions Nos. 4, 5 and 7
were prepared in accordance with the rule laid down
in Ehlers v. Langley, Goudal v. DeMille Pictures Corp.,
and Bang v. International Sisal Co., supra. They present
the only correct definition of the type of misconduct that
will justify discharge. They set forth correctly the standard by which the acts of the plaintiff n1ust be measured
and judged. Nowhere did the court atte1npt to advise the
jury on these points other than in its erroneous instruCtion No. 5.
29
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Plaintiff's proposed instructions No. 10 and No. 11
set forth the defendant's duty relative to the burden
of proof. The court in the previous case recognized that
the burden of proving justification for the discharge
rests upon the employer. As a part of this justification
is the requirement that the defendant must prove that
it was complied with the conditions precedent to discharge, Russell v. O.U.R. & D., supra. These rules are
universally recognized, not only by the federal courts
but by the courts of the various states.
See: New Orleans Belt Ry. v. Ward, supra; Cole
v. Loew's, Inc., supra, cert. denied 95 L. Ed. 686; Sawyer
v. Drew & Co., supra, affirmed 209 F. (2) 566; Hansen
v. Columbia Brewing Co. (Wash.) 122 P. (2) 489;
Lambert v. Laing & Thompson I ron W arks (Ore.) 264
P. 362; Lone Star Cotton "jfills v. Thomas (Tex.) 227
S.W. (2) 300; Schaffer v. Park City Bowl (ill.) 102
N.E. (2) 665; Johnson v. Thonzpson (Mo.) 236 S.W.
(2) 1.
The trial court refused to so instruct the jury as
to the burden of proof. Indeed a reading of the court's
instruction No. 5 shows it to be erroneous on the further
ground that it implies that the burden of proof to show
justification is on the plaintiff rather than the defendant. This misconception "\Yas prevalent throughout the
trial. The couns:el for the plaintiff vigorously contended
(Tr. 57-59) that the defendant must first prove its compliance with these conditions precedent before attenlpting to justify plaintiff's discharge under any theory. All
objections of p~laintiff "\vere overruled and the record
is devoid of any proof that the defendant did in fact
comply with its contractual prerequisites to discharge.
30
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In .so ruling on the evidence, and in so failing to
instruct on the burden of pro_of, the court prejudicially
and adversely affected the rights of the p1aintiff.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that plaintiff should have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law by reason of the
points hereinbefore set forth. However, it is submitted
that there is an even more cogent reason for the reversal of this judgment and the reinstatement of the
initial judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant. The Supreme c·ourt has heretofore held
that the plaintiff made out a prima facie c~se for judgment, but on the strength of the representations of the
counsel for the defendant that it all times had proof
that the plaintiff was not in fact ill and was in fact
working at the beer tavern all during the ten days' absence, which was the subject of the law suit, this court
determined that justice compelled affording the defendant the opportunity of making that proof. The defendant was afforded the opportunity of producing any and
all witnesses to show that the plaintiff was in fact
working each and every day at the Pine View Inn and
of producing evidence to show that the plaintiff was
not in fact ill. The record reflects the wide discrepancy
between the claims and the proof. The record is devoid
of any evidence that plaintiff was in fact working during
the ten day period. The record is likewise devoid of
any evidence to the effect that he was not in fact ill.
The medicines and testimony and conduct of the doctor
in releasing him to return to work all militate against
the defendant's proposition.
We reiterate that the fundamental basis for the re-
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versal by this court of the judgment in plaintiff's favor
in the first trial was defendant's representations to
this court that it could, and would if given the opportunity, prove the complete falsity of plaintiff's claimed illness; and that it could and would prove that he had lied
at his hearing concerning his illness, and that in truth
and in fact he was not ill but he was working elsewhere
during the period of his absence from the railroad.
Based thereon this court reversed on the previous appeal, and sent the case back to the lower court with directions that defendant's evidence on these matters be
received and considered. The case has now been retried, and the record on retrial is as devoid of any proof
of these asserted facts as was tlre original trial recordindeed, as devoid of proof of these facts as was the
record of the hearing that led to plaintiff's discharge.
It is submitted, therefore, in conclusion, that the
defendant was afforded an opportunity to which he
was not entitled under the federal rule, but that even
this wide latitude was insufficient to permit the defendant to produce any evidence to justify plaintiff's discharge.
Respectfully submitted,

NEIL R. OLMSTEAD,
C. C. PATTERSON,
Attorneys fo1· Appellant
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